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Since the discovery of the “framing effect” by Kahneman and Tversky, the sensitivity of
the “framing effect” – its appearance and in some cases its disappearance – has long been
an object of study. However there is little agreement as to the reasons for this sensitivity.
The “ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis” (Wang, 2008) aims to systematically explain the
sensitivity of this effect by paying particular attention to people’s cue priority: it states that
the framing effect occurs when verbal framing is used to compensate for the absence of
higher prioritized decision cues. The main purpose of our study is to examine and develop
this hypothesis by examining cue priority given differences in people’s “group experience.”
The main result is that the framing effect is absent when the choice problem is presented
in a group context that reﬂects the actual size of the group that the participant has had
experiencewith.Thus, in order to understand the choices that peoplemake in life and death
decisions, it is important to incorporate the decision maker’s group experience explicitly
into the ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis.
Keywords: framing effect, group size, cue priority, experience
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last three decades, empirical research on human cogni-
tion and decision-making behavior has shown a systematic bias in
a number of decision-making areas.Needless to say,one of the pio-
neering studies in this ﬁeldwas performedbyKahnemanandTver-
sky: on the framing effect in life and death decision problems (e.g.,
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
In their study, subjects were presented with a cover story, which
explained that 600 people were suspected to be infected with a
fatal Asian disease for which only two curative plans are available.
Speciﬁcally, Plan A has a deterministic outcome, while Plan B has
a probabilistic outcome. The deterministic outcome ensures the
survival of one-third of the patients (i.e., 200 survivors), while the
probabilistic outcome results in a one-third probability that all of
the patients will survive, and a two-thirds probability that no one
will survive. After the subjects read the cover story, they were asked
to choose one of the two plans.
The classic demonstration of the framing effect (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981) is as follows: when this problemwas represented
in terms of saving lives (a “positive frame”), most subjects (72%)
were risk-averse: the certain survival of 200 lives was more attrac-
tive than the risky choice, that is, a one-third chance of saving all
600 lives. When this problem was represented in terms of losing
lives (a“negative frame”), in contrast,most subjects (78%) favored
the risky choice: the assured death of 400 people was less attractive
than the two-thirds probability that all 600 could die.
A number of studies have been conducted to test the reliability
and generality of Tversky and Kahneman’s original work on the
framing effect. On the one hand, using the standard cover story,
strong framing effects have been replicated not only in different
kinds of respondents, such as university faculty staff, students,
and physicians (McNeil et al., 1982) but also in various applied
areas (Burton and Babin, 1989; Kramer, 1989; Travis et al., 1989).
On the other hand, some studies have shown little or no framing
effect when the context or cover story was manipulated. This sug-
gests that the framing effect may not be as general and as robust
a choice phenomenon as one thought, because it is sensitive to
both the context in which the problem is described (Fagley and
Miller, 1987; Schneider, 1992; Wang and Johnston, 1995; Wang,
1996a,b; Takemura, 2001;Wang et al., 2001) and to various cogni-
tive and social variables (Roszkowski and Snelbecker, 1990; Miller
and Fagley, 1991; Shoorman et al., 1994).
In support for context-dependent line of inquiry, a series of
studies by Wang et al. (2001) observed an obvious effect of con-
textual group size on people’s attitude to risk. Table 1 summarizes
Wang’s previous research, almost all of which used a sample of
university students, showing how people’s attitude to risk changes
when the contextual group size is manipulated in the life and
death decision problem. By closely examining these results, we can
emphasize one major ﬁnding: an absence of the framing effect.
The framing effect is seen only when the decision problem was
presented in large group contexts, in this case, 6000 or 600 people.
However, this bias was eliminated when the same problem was
posed in terms of small groups, consisting of 6 or 60 people.
While this absence of the framing effect in small group con-
texts has been replicatedwith university students (e.g., Bloomﬁeld,
2006; Zhang and Miao, 2008), other researchers (e.g., Shimizu
and Udagawa, 2011) continued to report a robust framing effect
when using a general public sample. Their data (Shimizu and
Udagawa, 2011) is shown in Table 2. How does a shift in
participant populations affect the appearance and disappearance
of the framing effect? The main purpose of this study is to answer
that question in terms of the“ambiguity–ambivalence hypothesis,”
explained in the next section. The point we want tomake, is that in
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Table 1 | Group size effects: percentages of participants choosing the probabilistic alternative.
Wang and Johnston (1995)
Group size=6000 Group size=600 Group size=60 Group size=6
Positive frame 40.9% (n=44) 40.0% (n =50) 67.5% (n =40) 64.0% (n =50)
Negative frame 61.4% (n =44) 68.0% (n =50) 65.0% (n =40) 70.0% (n =50)
Framing effects Yes Yes No No
Wang (1996b)
Group size=6000 Group size=600 Group size=60 Group size=6
Positive frame 38.7% (n =31) 41.9% (n =31) 57.6% (n =33) 66.7% (n =30)
Negative frame 66.3% (n =30) 76.5% (n =34) 66.7% (n =30) 75.6% (n =33)
Framing effects Yes Yes No No
Wang et al. (2001)
Group size=6 billion Group size=6
Positive frame 36.0% (n =50) 70.0% (n =50)
Negative frame 66.0% (n =50) 70.0% (n =50)
Framing effects Yes No
Table 2 | Percentages of the probabilistic alternative of the life-death
decision problem across three sizes in a national survey.
Shimizu and Udagawa (2011)
Group size=600 Group size=60 Group size=6
Positive frame 31.2% (n =173) 32.6% (n =172) 43.4% (n =166)
Negative frame 45.5% (n =156) 58.4% (n =149) 54.0% (n =150)
Framing effects Yes Yes Yes
In group size 600, Pearson’s Independence Test: χ 2(1)=7.119, p value=0.008.
In group size 60, χ 2(1)=21.565, p value=0.000. In group size 6, χ 2(1)=3.563,
p value=0.059; In group size 600, DK/NA (147 people) is excluded from the analy-
sis. In group size 60, DK/NA (140 people) is excluded from the analysis. In group
size 6, DK/NA (144 people) is excluded from the analysis.
order to understand people’s choice patterns in life and death deci-
sion problems, it is important to take into account not only their
inherent biases but also their personal experience of groups in real
life. The rest of the paper will be structured as follows, Section
2 explains the essence of the ambiguity-ambivalence hypoth-
esis. Section 3 reframes the ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis
in terms of our predictions about personal group experience.
Section 4 presents results of an experiment supporting this view.
Implications for these results will be discussed in Section 5.
2. AMBIGUITY–AMBIVALENCE HYPOTHESIS
The ambiguity–ambivalence hypothesis (Wang, 1996a, 2008) aims
to systematically explain the disappearance of the framing effect.
This hypothesis, drawing on evolutionary concepts, proposes the
following assumptions: “(1) Decision cues are selected and used
in accordance to their priorities. (2) Cue priority reﬂects the
evolutionary and ecological validity of a cue in predicting speciﬁc
risks. (3) Primary cues in risk communication carry evolutionary,
ecological, and social signiﬁcance and anchor decision reference
points, while secondary cues of verbal communication ﬁne-tune
the settings of reference points. (4) Inconsistent decision biases
tend to occur as a result of secondary cue use when primary
cues are absent in risk communication (i.e., an ambiguity con-
dition) or when primary cues elicit conﬂicting preferences (i.e., an
ambivalence condition)” (Wang, 2008, p. 82).
According to this hypothesis, the framing effect was evident in
both the 6000 people and 600 people groups because the life and
death problem was presented in a large, anonymous, and hence
ambiguous context: group size variables (6000 and 600) then,
cannot function as primary cues. On the other hand, the fram-
ing effect was absent in groups of 60 and 6 people, because these
group sizes indicate a high level of interdependency, and is likely
to have evoked familial, kinship relationships in the subjects. Size
variables (60 and 6), then, can function as primary cues. Generally
speaking, this hypothesis states that verbal framing as a secondary
cue has the most obvious effect only when a choice is presented in
an evolutionarily novel and ambiguous context in which primary
cues are absent or produces conﬂicting risk preferences.
We agree that an evolutionary perspective sufﬁciently cap-
tures the reason for the seemingly inconsistent decision biases
observed in a context-dependent choice phenomena. However,
there is room for further investigation as towhat“evolutionary and
ecological validity of a cue” means and how this affects people’s
cue choice. Our interpretation of this is outlined in the following
section.
3. PEOPLE’S EXPERIENCES AND EVOLVED
DECISION-MAKING RULES
Evolutionary psychology suggests that the human mind consists
of psychological mechanisms derived from the human Environ-
ment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA). For example, the size
of a Pleistocene hunter-gatherer society is estimated to consist
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of around 100–200 people (Cosmides and Tooby, 1989, 2000;
de Waal, 1996)1. A considerable number of studies support that
ﬁgures around 150 are frequently observed among a wide range of
contemporary human societies, including farming communities,
sub-disciplines of academic communities, and basic army units
(Mange and Mange, 1980; Hardin, 1988; Becher, 1989).
On the basis of this discussion, it is natural to suppose that
people tend to consider a small sized group to be a community
held together emotionally by fate. Thus, they might be more likely
to prioritize small group sizes as ecologically valid cues rather than
large group sizes in the life and death decision problem, so that the
framing effect disappears in the small group context, containing
6 and 60 people. Let us paraphrase this argument by focusing on
the fact that humanminds evolve through the interplay of biology
and culture.
As mentioned in the introduction, while the absence of the
framing effect appears to be stable in experiments using university
student samples (Wang and Johnston,1995;Wang,1996a,b,c, 2008;
Wang et al., 2001; Bloomﬁeld, 2006; Zhang and Miao, 2008), this
is not the case for experiments using the general public (Shimizu
and Udagawa, 2011). However, if decision-making is inﬂuenced
by acquired elements, such as group experience in real life, the
general public may have a different cue priority from students.
This is the point that we intend to add to the original ambiguity–
ambivalence hypothesis.
From the perspective of evolutionarily inherited biases, groups
of 6 and 60 can be valid cues, because they are smaller than the
EEA size; groups of 600 and 6000 cannot, because they are greater.
This argument is valid for both university students and the general
public. This is also supported by personal experience, groups of
600 and 6000 are unlikely to be a primary cue both for univer-
sity students and for the general public, because experience with
groups of such a large size is uncommon in our society. However,
this is not the case for groups of 6 and 60.
On the one hand, groups of 6 and 60 can serve as valid cues for
university students, due to the fact that 6 corresponds to the size
of families, and 60 is not far from group sizes encountered in their
school lives.On the other hand, it is possible that the general public
does not focus on small group sizes such as those of 6 or 60 people
as closely as students, since the general public is more varied than
university students in terms of group experience. Although family
remains an important group for them, we may assume that some
of them are living independently from the families in which they
were born/raised, and that they may have other important group
experiences such as working for a company, or union activities, in
which group sizes can be larger than 6 or 60. In short, compared
to university students, their various experiences can prevent them
from giving immediate priority to smaller group sizes.
This intuition that one’s group experience can affect his/her
cue priority is supported by several lines of inquiry. On the one
hand, it is well known in both cognitive and social psychology that
1According to neuroscience, the size of a social animal’s neocortex is causally related
to that of group size. Dunber (1995) calculated the size of hunter-gatherer societies
by regressing group size with the size of human neocortex. The predicted group size
was 147.8, and the 95% conﬁdence limits around this prediction were from 100.2 to
231.1.
our cognitive processes are frequently inﬂuenced by our sense of
group membership (e.g., Tajfel, 1970, 1981; Brewer, 1979). On the
other hand, a considerable number of studies in various ﬁelds have
shown that prior experiences affect the decision makers’ attitude
toward risk (e.g., Levin andChapman, 1990, 1993; Roszkowski and
Snelbecker, 1990; Zhang and Miao, 2008). Little attention, how-
ever, has been paid to the prior experience of group membership
on cue priority. Rothman and Salovey (1997) provided a focused
review of framing effects in health-related decisions, showing that
although a message is advocated by a particular frame, such as
gain or loss, the framed information is not automatically accepted
by the receiver; “an individual’s knowledge and experiences with
an issue can play important roles to determine whether a particu-
lar frame is accepted or deﬂected” (p. 16). It seems reasonable to
extend their argument about one’swillingness to adopt a particular
frame to one’s tendency to prioritize a particular cue.
4. EXPERIMENT: EFFECT OF EXPERIENCE ON CUE PRIORITY
The main purpose of this experiment was to examine how the
experience of groups in real life affects people’s cue priority. Par-
ticipants were quizzed on questions that not only revealed their
degree of family experience, but also their group experiences
beyond that of family.
4.1. SUBJECTS
For this study, we consigned a web experiment through a private
research company and used the members pooled by that company
as subjects. These members voluntarily apply for membership to
the company, and can choose to answer the administered survey
questions diffused over the internet. Participation can be done
in their homes, as the experimental instructions are presented on
their computer screens. After the experiment, the company ran-
domly extracts the collected data and pays these respondents a fee.
The experiment took place between 18/02/2010 and 26/02/2010,
with 1893 subjects: 860 female (45.4%) and 1033 male (54.6%),
excluding DK (don’t know)/NA (no answer) responses. The mean
age was 42.4 years (standard deviation: 12.6 years, range: 20–
69 years). The student sample was very small, representing only
0.5% of the total sample.
One oftnoted drawback of suchweb experiments is sample bias,
resulting from issues such as the digital divide. Although the com-
pany shufﬂes its members every year and we tried to use as widely
distributed a sample as possible, the problem of digital division
may not be negligible when the results are generalized. However,
to explicitly consider experience-related variables, it is necessary
to use a subject sample whose range of experience is greater than
those of than a university student sample. Thus, we decided to
conduct a web experiment with a general population rather than
a laboratory experiment using university students.
4.2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
For this study, we principally used the same experimental design
described in the introduction, apart from the number of group
sizes. While group size previously consisted of 3 categories (600,
60, and 6), or 4 categories (6000, 600, 60, and 6), in this experiment
we used 6 categories: 60000, 6000, 600, 150, 60, and 6. The addi-
tional group sizes sought to explore the size effect a little further
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and to directly compare the estimated threshold of EEA group
size–namely 150. Subjects were randomly presented with one of
the different versions of the life and death problem and were asked
to choose a medical plan.
Since the subject’s experience in groups of different sizes is
hypothesized to inﬂuence his or her way of considering group
size as a primary cue in life-death decisions, we had prepared,
after their choice of Plan A or Plan B, not only a demographics
questionnaire (including sex, age,marital status, residential status,
profession, and revenue) but also a question about their group
experiences. While questions about marital and residential status
of the former set were mainly used to query their family situation,
the latter targeted how deeply committed they are to group(s)
besides their family. The latter question was, “To which groups
or organizations do you commit enthusiastically or quite enthu-
siastically? Choose all that apply from the following list.” The list
of groups/organizations consisted of “trade associations, agricul-
tural cooperatives, labor unions, consumer cooperatives, NGOs,
religious organizations, groups for study or lessons, groups for
hobbies or pleasure, volunteer groups, alumni (alumnae) associ-
ations, neighborhood self-governing bodies, and others2.” While
the ﬁrst 5 groups/organizations are considered to be closely related
to the subjects’ economic interests, the last 6 categories are less
2Wemodeled this list on a standard Japanese social opinion survey. The survey con-
siders these 11 groups and organizations as important to ordinary Japanese social
life.
closely so. Further, subjects were asked to provide the size of
each group or organization to which they were committed. In this
answer, 1 corresponds to 2∼ 4 members; 2 to 5∼ 9; 3 to 10∼ 29;
4 to 30∼ 99; 5 to 100∼ 199; 6 to 200∼ 299; 7 to 300∼ 999; 8 to
1000∼ 4999; 9 to 5000∼ 9999; and 10 to over 10000 (seeTable 3)3.
4.3. PREDICTIONS
Based on previous research and the evolutionary approach we
put forward in Section 3, we hypothesized that the framing effect
would not be observed in a group size which is prioritized both by
evolutionary inheritance and by acquired experience.
That is, we predict that the framing effect disappears in group
size 6 for subjects who are responsible for managing the family;
and disappears in group size 60 for those who are deeply involved
in groups or organizations whose size is also around 60.
4.4. RESULTS1: FAMILY EXPERIENCE AND CUE PRIORITY
Table 4 reveals the presence of the framing effect in all 6 group
sizes. The critical question motivated by the main research inter-
est of this experiment is whether this framing effect interacts with
group experience, guiding differences in people’s cue priority.
In this web experiment, as well as in Shimizu and Udagawa
(2011), the framing effect was not observed even for group size
3Inmaking this scale, we ensured that each contextual group size – 60000, 6000, 600,
150, 60 and 6 – is represented by a different number. The estimated EEA group size
from100.2 to 231.1 (Dunber, 1995) is generally covered by the answer 5 (100∼ 199).
Table 3 | Frequency of subjects by size of each group/organization.
Group/organization 2–4 5–9 10–29 30–99 100–199 200–299 300–999 1000–4999 5000–9999 Over 10000 Sum
Trade association 3 20 41 37 17 6 8 10 1 15 158
Agricultural cooperative 1 1 2 1 1 2 0 1 0 2 11
Labor union 0 2 6 5 6 3 12 9 3 16 62
Consumer cooperative 5 7 1 2 1 0 1 7 2 13 39
NGO 0 3 7 9 3 0 1 1 0 1 25
Religious organization 0 1 7 5 5 0 1 1 0 23 43
Group for study/lesson 23 77 96 28 5 2 8 1 0 1 241
Group for hobby/pleasure 87 218 186 58 10 4 1 2 2 0 568
Volunteer group 2 13 45 32 9 3 1 2 0 2 109
Alumni(alumnae) association 11 40 87 75 17 6 14 3 0 2 255
Neighborhood self-governing body 3 16 85 55 23 7 24 10 0 3 226
Others 9 24 31 19 6 2 8 2 0 2 103
Table 4 | Percentages of the probabilistic alternative of the life-death decision across six sizes.
With total sample (n=1893)
Group size=60000 Group size=6000 Group size=600 Group size=150 Group size=60 Group size=6
Positive frame 26.1% (n=165) 24.8% (n =161) 29.6% (n =169) 33.1% (n =163) 34.3% (n =169) 43.6% (n =156)
Negative frame 43.0% (n =172) 43.1% (n =144) 46.8% (n =141) 48.4% (n =157) 47.5% (n =158) 63.8% (n =138)
P value of the FE 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.016 0.000
In group size 60000, Pearson’s IndependenceTest: χ 2(1)=10.691. In group size 6000, χ 2(1)=11.325. In group size 600, χ 2(1)=9.737. In group size 150, χ 2(1)=7.740.
In group size 60, χ 2(1)=5.851. In group size 6, χ 2(1)=11.971. DK/NA (446 people) is excluded from the analysis. The last row shows p values of the framing effect.
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6 (p value is 0.001). Thus, we re-examined the framing effect for
every group sizewith a selected sample thatwehypothesizedwould
give high priority to a group size variable of 6 people. As we argued
in Section 3, the framing effect should disappear in the group size
6 condition with a sample selected to prioritize these cues because
they have had experience with groups of this size. However, we
cannot logically predict the direction of effect in the other group
sizes.
Firstly, by using the participant’s demographic data,we selected
a subset of 723 subjects (hereafter sample S), who were heads of
households or homemakers living with children. Although most
humansdevelop experiences of family andkinship, sample S might
prioritize cues about 6 people more than others because they are,
intuitively, those responsible for managing a family. Because of
their commitment to the family, we expect them to focus on this
speciﬁc cue.
Table 5 reveals an absence of the framing effect for sample S in
group size 6 (p value is 0.289)4. This is because the difference in
risk choices between the two frames is smaller for sample S com-
pared to the whole sample (the difference between the two frames
is 20.2% for the whole sample and 10.2% for sample S). It follows
that the framing effect is highly signiﬁcant in group size 6 for the
subset of participants that did not belong to sample S (hereafter
sample SC; p value is 0.000).
Secondly, we tested whether the framing effect for sample S
(i.e., the difference between the positive and negative frames:
61.1%− 50.9%= 10.2%) was signiﬁcantly different from that for
sample SC’s (i.e., 65.4%− 39.8%= 25.6%). The interaction coefﬁ-
cientβ3 should be signiﬁcant in the followingmodel if the framing
effect is stronger for sample SC than sample S5:
ModelA : log
(
pi
/
1 − pi
) = β0 + β1Framei
+β2Familyi + β3Framei ∗ Familyi
4There is an unexpected observation which needs to be mentioned. The framing
effect is also absent in group size 150 (p value is 0.504). If group experience affects
cue priority as we predicted, sample S might have also tended to commit to some
groups/organizations, whose size would also be around 150 people. However, we
cannot say for certain whether our guess is valid, because our question about group
experience is not complete enough to detect people’s group experience in real life.
5If the probability of the ith respondent’s probabilistic outcome choice is written by
pi, the dependent variable is deﬁned as logit (pi); that is, log pi/1− pi.β is a standard-
ized binomial logit regression coefﬁcient. Framing (Framei ) is dummy coded as 1 if
subject i responded to the negative frame problem, otherwise, 0. Family (Familyi )
is also dummy coded as 1 if subject i belonged to sample SC and otherwise, 0.
The results show that while both β1 and β2 are not signiﬁcant
(p values 0.290 and 0.185 respectively), β3 is signiﬁcant (exp β3
is 2.047, p value of z-test 0.007 and standard error 0.268). Thus,
the two samples signiﬁcantly differed in the size of their framing
effect in the group size 6 condition.
4.5. RESULTS 2: GROUP EXPERIENCE AND CUE PRIORITY
So far, the results of statistical analysis show an absence of the
framing effect in a sample that might adopt a group size of 6
as a primary cue. If experience shapes cue priority, the same
phenomenon should be observed in other group sizes.
As shown in Table 4, the framing effect is evident in group size
60 for thewhole sample. If we focus onpeoplewho are likely to give
high cue priority to groups of size 60, the framing effect should dis-
appear for that group (we cannot logically predict the presence or
absence of the framing effect in the other sizes). From their ques-
tionnaire answers concerning the subjects’ group experiences, we
selected subjects who were deeply involved in groups or organiza-
tions at a scale that is greater than that of the family, and below
that of the EEA maximum: i.e., those who answered (3) 10∼ 29,
(4) 30∼ 99, or (5) 100∼ 199 for any groups or organizations (the
total of this sample is 670)6. For this sample (hereafter sample T ),
we hypothesized that they have inherited a deep involvement in
groups/organizations of a scale that reminds them of a commu-
nity, hence allowing them to focus on group size 60 as a primary
cue when also faced with group size variable of 60.
Consistentwith our prediction, the statistical analysis of Table 6
revealed an absence of the framing effect for a group size of 60
for sample T (p value is 0.266). Within the total sample, the dif-
ference in risk choice between the two frames was signiﬁcantly
different at 13.2%, while the difference in sample T was 10.3%7.
For the remaining participants (sample TC), the framing effect is
signiﬁcant (p value is 0.041)
6The number of participants in sample T (670) is not the sum of participants who
responded to groups of size “10∼ 29,”“30∼ 99,” and“100∼ 199” in Table 3. This is
because participants could choose several groups or organization at the same time.
For example, they can participate in a Religious organization of size 30–99 as well
as a Volunteer group of size 100–199.
7While it is established that the maximum size of EEA is around 150, some scholars
insist that typical group sizes in EEA were often around 30 (e.g., Marlowe, 2007).
On the basis of the latter idea, we reran the same analysis with the 58 subjects who
answered (3) 10∼ 29 or (4) 30∼ 99. The result remained non-signiﬁcant (p value is
0.190). Thus, the result does not essentially change. However, this result is tentative
due to the small number of participants in the analysis.
Table 5 | Percentages of the probabilistic alternative of the life-death decision across six sizes.
With sample S (n=723)
Group size=60000 Group size=6000 Group size=600 Group size=150 Group size=60 Group size=6
Positive frame 24.6% (n=65) 30.5% (n =59) 37.1% (n =62) 43.3% (n =60) 35.9% (n =64) 50.9% (n =53)
Negative frame 42.7% (n =75) 50.9% (n =53) 53.6% (n =56) 49.3% (n =67) 52.7% (n =55) 61.1% (n =54)
P value of the FE 0.025 0.028 0.072 0.504 0.066 0.289
In group size 60000, Pearson’s IndependenceTest: χ 2(1)=5.036. In group size 6000, χ 2(1)=4.851. In group size 600, χ 2(1)=3.228. In group size 150, χ 2(1)=0.446.
In group size 60, χ 2(1)=3.389. In group size 6, χ 2(1)=1.123. DK/NA (446 people) is excluded from the analysis. The last row shows p values of the framing effect.
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Similar to Section 4.5, we also tested whether the differ-
ence in sample T ’s choice in positive and negative frames
(i.e., 43.6%− 33.3%= 10.3%) was signiﬁcantly different from
that of sample TC’s difference between both frames (i.e.,
49.5%− 35.6%= 13.9%). Again, we expect that the interaction
coefﬁcient β3 would be signiﬁcant, such that the framing effect is
stronger with sample TC than with sample T 8:
Model B : log
(
pi
/
1 − pi
) = β0 + β1Framei
+β2Groupi + β3Framei ∗ Groupi
The result of this analysis showed that while both β1 and β2
were not signiﬁcant (p value is 0.278 and 0.859 respectively),
β3 was signiﬁcant (p value of z-test 0.028 and standard error
0.241). Thus, there were signiﬁcant differences in the framing
effect between sample T and TC.
The combination of results from Sections 4.4 and 4.5, support
our prediction about the framing effect: the framing effect is nul-
liﬁed in contextual group sizes of both 6 and 60 for a sample that
has selectively had real experience with these group sizes.
It is worth pointing out how people, who categorically belong
to both S and T at the same time, prioritize their cues. Follow-
ing the argument in 4.4 and this section, we can suppose that the
framing effect should not appear for these people in both the 6 and
60 group conditions. Table 7 supports this prediction and addi-
tionally shows an interesting ﬁnding. The framing effect does not
appear in any of the categories for these people. We cannot rea-
sonably explain here why and how the framing effect disappears
8In this model,Group (Groupi ) is dummy coded as 1 if subject i belonged to sample
TC and otherwise, 0. The other variables were coded as described in model A.
for this sample, for example this may be partly due to an insufﬁ-
cient number of participants in the statistical analysis, but it may
be important to keep this ﬁnding in mind.
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Given that human perception is hardwired through an evolution-
ary process, the results of this experiment support the argument
that one needs to consider not only people’s inherent biases but
also their acquired experiences in order to understand the way in
which cues are prioritized in life and death decisions. To explore
the further possibilities of this research, we should clarify the
points that call for discussion.
The ﬁrst is related to the questionnaire we prepared probing
subjects’ experiences in social groups, in order to classify their
group experience. We recognize at least two problems with this
attempt.
Firstly, it was difﬁcult to test the effect of personal group expe-
rience on cue priority for the life-death decision problem when
the contextual group size is greater than 100. This is due to the fact
that subjects clustered on the smaller sized groups/organizations
(see Table 3). In other words, in conducting a standard laboratory
or web experiment, there are insufﬁcient numbers of participants
with large group experiences. In this case, ﬁeld experiments may
be helpful, particularly if conducted in an area where subjects are
working or living in a large group, such as a factory, military base,
or farming collective.
Secondly, the present question only quizzed group experience
on 11 groups or organizations considered to be important in
Japanese social life. Thus, it excludes other important organiza-
tions, such as production groups represented by companies or
factories. Since, from an evolutionary standpoint, it is plausible to
Table 6 | Percentages of the probabilistic alternative of the life-death decision across six sizes.
With sampleT (n=670)
Group size=60000 Group size=6000 Group size=600 Group size=150 Group size=60 Group size=6
Positive frame 18.6% (n=70) 35.2% (n =54) 30.3% (n =66) 36.7% (n =60) 33.3% (n =51) 40.7% (n =59)
Negative frame 37.5% (n =56) 51.2% (n =43) 44.4% (n =45) 52.7% (n =55) 43.6% (n =55) 67.9% (n =56)
P value of the FE 0.017 0.114 0.128 0.083 0.266 0.003
In group size 60000, Pearson’s IndependenceTest: χ 2(1)=5.658. In group size 6000, χ 2(1)=2.504. In group size 600, χ 2(1)=2.321. In group size 150, χ 2(1)=2.999.
In group size 60, χ 2(1)=1.184. In group size 6, χ 2(1)=8.542. DK/NA (131 people) is excluded from the analysis. The last row shows p values of the framing effect.
Table 7 | Percentages of the probabilistic alternative of the life-death decision across six sizes.
With sample S capT (n=290)
Group size=60000 Group size=6000 Group size=600 Group size=150 Group size=60 Group size=6
Positive frame 18.8% (n=32) 47.6% (n =21) 36.7% (n =30) 42.3% (n =26) 34.5% (n =29) 56.0% (n =25)
Negative frame 37.0% (n =27) 60.0% (n =20) 62.5% (n =16) 56.0% (n =25) 55.6% (n =18) 61.9% (n =21)
P value of the FE 0.147 0.536 0.126 0.406 0.226 0.769
In group size 60000, Pearson’s IndependenceTest: χ 2(1)=2.478. In group size 6000, χ 2(1)=0.631. In group size 600, χ 2(1)=2.807. In group size 150, χ 2(1)=0.956.
In group size 60, χ 2(1)=2.018. In group size 6, χ 2(1)=0.164. DK/NA (53 people) is excluded from the analysis. The last raw shows p values of the framing effect.
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suppose that this kind of experience would affect cue priority, we
need to know more about subjects’ group experience in produc-
tion sites, in order tomeasure their level of group experiencemore
precisely.
In addition to these limitations, there are two interesting points.
One is an alternative explanation of disappearance/occurrence of
the framing effect. This explanation highlights individual differ-
ences in cognitive abilities, such as numeracy. Peters and Levin
(2008) reveals that the less numerate showed amore direct effect of
framing, compared to the highly numerate.Assuming that the gen-
eral public is lower than university students in terms of numeracy,
this explanation appears to be consistent with the pattern of the
framing effects in our sample. In a similar vein, Frederick (2005)
stated that people with lower cognitive ability generally tend to
prefer the deterministic choice to the probabilistic choice. Risk-
averseness, due to low cognitive ability, might prevent our sample
from being risk-seeking in both frames when the contextual group
size is small, resulting in the framing effect across all conditions.
Since these studies (i.e., Frederick, 2005; Peters and Levin, 2008)
do not focus on the manipulation of contextual group size in the
life and death problem, it is premature to attribute the existence of
the framing effect in small group sizes to differences in the sam-
ple’s cognitive ability. Future research in group size manipulations
might seek to also measure participant’s cognitive ability.
The other is the possibility of another nurture element beyond
group experience affecting decision-making under uncertain
conditions. If we compare the percentages of the subjects that
choose the probabilistic choice between our sample (Japanese)
and those percentages found in previous research (American or
Belgian), the former sample is consistently more risk-averse than
the latter sample. In comparison with Wang (1996b) and Wang
et al. (2001), the percentage of Japanese subjects who chose the
probabilistic choice is usually smaller than those of American
or European subjects by 10∼ 30% across every contextual size.
Olivola and Sagara (2009) showed in a cross-national study of
risk preference that the tendency to be risk-seeking in the life
and death decision problem is lower in countries in which high-
mortality events are more frequently observed. It is debatable
whethermortality-related events aremore often observed in Japan
than in the U.S.A and Belgium. However it is important to bear
in mind that cross-national differences in the social environment,
such as human fatalities, may inﬂuence people’s risk attitude.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank the participants of the 20th Annual Meet-
ing of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society (2008) for
their helpful suggestions. This paper owes much to the thought-
ful and helpful comments of Professor X. T. Wang and Profes-
sor Jonathan Baron. We gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support
from the Global COE program of Political Economy and Insti-
tutional Construction (I-13) and the Grant-in-Aid for Scientiﬁc
Research on Priority Areas (19046002). All support was provided
by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science
and Technology.
REFERENCES
Becher, T. (1989). Academic Tribes and
Territories. Milton Keynes: Open
University Press.
Bloomﬁeld, A. N. (2006). Group size
and the framing effect: threats to
human beings and animals. Mem.
Cognit. 34, 929–937.
Brewer, M. B. (1979). Ingroup bias in
the minimal intergroup situation: a
cognitive-motivational analysis.Psy-
chol. Bull. 86, 307–324.
Burton, S., and Babin, L. A. (1989).
Decision-framing helps make the
sale. J Consum. Mark. 6, 15–24.
Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. (1989). Evo-
lutionary psychology and the gener-
ation of culture: part II. A computa-
tion theory of social exchange. Ethol.
Sociobiol. 10, 51–97.
Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. (2000).
“Toward mapping the evolved func-
tional organization of mind and
brain,” in The New Cognitive Neu-
rosciences, 2nd Edn, ed. M. S. Gaz-
zaniga (Cambridge,MA:MITPress),
1167–1178.
de Waal, F. (1996). Good Natured:
The Origin of Right and Wrong
in Humans and Other Animals.
Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Dunber, R. I. M. (1995). Neocortex size
and group size in primates: a test
of the hypothesis. J. Hum. Evol. 28,
287–296.
Fagley, N. S., and Miller, P. M. (1987).
The effects of decision framing on
choice of risky vs certain options.
Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process.
39, 264–277.
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reﬂec-
tion and decision making. J. Econ.
Perspect. 19, 24–42.
Hardin, G. (1988). Common failing.
New Sci. 102, 76.
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979).
Prospect theory: an analysis of deci-
sions under risk. Econometrica 47,
313–327.
Kramer, R. M. (1989). Windows of
vulnerability or cognitive illusions?
Cognitive processes and the nuclear
arms race. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 25,
79–100.
Levin, I. P., and Chapman, D. P. (1990).
Risk taking, frame of reference, and
characterization of victim groups in
AIDS treatment decisions. J. Exp.
Soc. Psychol. 26, 421–434.
Levin, I. P., and Chapman, D. P.
(1993). Risky decision making and
allocation of resources for leukemia
and AIDS programs. Health Psychol.
12, 110–117.
Mange,A., andMange,E. (1980).Genet-
ics: Human Aspects. Philadelphia:
Saunders.
Marlowe, F. W. (2007). Hunting and
gathering: thehuman sexual division
of foraging labor. Cross Cult. Res. 41,
170–195.
McNeil, B. J., Pauker, S. G., Sox, H. C.
Jr., and Tversky, A. (1982). On the
elicitation of preferences for alterna-
tive therapies. N. Engl. J. Med. 306,
1259–1262.
Miller, P. M., and Fagley, N. S. (1991).
The effects of framing,problemvari-
ations, and providing rationale on
choice. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 17,
517–522.
Olivola, C. Y., and Sagara, N. (2009).
Distributions of observed death tolls
govern sensitivity to human fatali-
ties. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 106,
22151–22156.
Peters, E., and Levin, I. P. (2008).
Dissecting the risky-choice framing
effect: numeracy as an individual-
difference factor in weighting risky
and riskless options. Judgm. Decis.
Mak. 3, 435–448.
Roszkowski, M. J., and Snelbecker, G.
E. (1990). Effects of “framing” on
measures of risk tolerance: ﬁnancial
planners are not immune. J. Behav.
Econ. 19, 237–246.
Rothman, A. J., and Salovey, P. (1997).
Shaping perceptions to motivate
healthy behavior: the role of message
framing. Psychol. Bull. 121, 3–19.
Schneider, S. L. (1992). Framing and
conﬂict: aspiration level contin-
gency, the status quo, and cur-
rent theories of risky choice. J.
Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 18,
1040–1057.
Shimizu, K., and Udagawa, D. (2011). A
re-examination of the effect of con-
textual group size on people’s atti-
tude to risk. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 6,
156–162.
Shoorman, F. D., Mayer, R. C., Dou-
glas, C. A., and Hetrick, C. T. (1994).
Escalation of commitment and the
framing effect: an empirical inves-
tigation. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 24,
509–528.
Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in inter-
group discrimination. Sci. Am. 223,
96–102.
Tajfel, H. (1981). Human Groups
and Social Categories: Studies
in Social Psychology. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Takemura, K. (2001). “Contingent
decision making in the social
world,” in Decision Making: Social
and Creative Dimensions, eds
C. M. Allwood and M. Selart
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic),
153–173.
Travis, C. B., Phillippi, R. H., and Tonn,
B. E. (1989). Judgment heuristics
www.frontiersin.org October 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 265 | 7
Shimizu and Udagawa Does experience affect cue priority?
and medical decisions. Patient Educ.
Couns. 13, 211–220.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1981).
The framing of decisions and the
psychology of choice. Science 211,
452–458.
Wang, X. T. (1996a). Evolution-
ary hypotheses of risk-sensitive
choice: age differences and perspec-
tive change. Ethol. Sociobiol. 17,
1–15.
Wang, X. T. (1996b). Framing effects:
dynamics and task domains. Organ.
Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 68,
145–157.
Wang, X. T. (1996c). Domain-speciﬁc
rationality in human choices:
violations of utility axioms and
social contexts. Cognition 60, 31–63.
Wang, X. T. (2008). Risk communi-
cation and risky choice in context
ambiguity and ambivalence hypoth-
esis. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1128,
78–89.
Wang, X. T., and Johnston, V. S.
(1995). Perceived social context and
risk preference: a re-examination of
framing effects in a life-death deci-
sion problem. J. Behav. Decis. Mak.
8, 279–293.
Wang, X. T., Simons, F., and Bredart, S.
(2001). Social cues and verbal fram-
ing in risky choice. J. Behav. Decis.
Mak. 14, 1–15.
Zhang, Y., and Miao, D. (2008). Social
cues and framing effects in risky
decisions among Chinese military
students. Asian J. Soc. Psychol. 11,
241–246.
Conﬂict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any
commercial or ﬁnancial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conﬂict of interest.
Received: 04 March 2011; accepted: 25
September 2011; published online: 12
October 2011.
Citation: Shimizu K and Udagawa D
(2011) How can group experience inﬂu-
ence the cue priority? A re-examination
of the ambiguity-ambivalence hypoth-
esis. Front. Psychology 2:265. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00265
This article was submitted to Frontiers
in Evolutionary Psychology, a specialty of
Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2011 Shimizu and Uda-
gawa. This is an open-access article sub-
ject to a non-exclusive license between the
authors and Frontiers Media SA, which
permits use, distribution and reproduc-
tion in other forums, provided the original
authors and source are credited and other
Frontiers conditions are complied with.
Frontiers in Psychology | Evolutionary Psychology October 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 265 | 8
Shimizu and Udagawa Does experience affect cue priority?
APPENDIX
Versions of the Life-Death Decision Problem in Experiments
POSITIVE FRAME VERSION
Imagine that 6 (60, 150, 600, 6000, or 60000) people are infected
by a fatal disease. Two alternative medical plans to treat the disease
have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientiﬁc estimates of
the consequences of the plans are as follows:
• If plan A is adopted, 2 (20, 50, 200, 2000, or 20000) people will
be saved.
• If plan B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that all 6 (60,
150, 600, 6000, or 60000) people will be saved, and a two-thirds
probability that none of them will be saved.
Which of the two plans would you favor?
NEGATIVE FRAME VERSION
Imagine that 6 (60, 150, 600, 6000, or 60000) people are infected
by a fatal disease. Two alternative medical plans to treat the disease
have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientiﬁc estimates of
the consequences of the plans are as follows:
• If plan A is adopted, 4 (40, 100, 400, 4000, or 40000) people will
die.
• If plan B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that none
of them will die, and a two-thirds probability that all 6 (60, 150,
600, 6000, or 60000) will die.
Which of the two plans would you favor?
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